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Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
Appendix A Figure 1: Assignment scores, survey response and private school attendance
Notes: figures based on "base sample" (see text and Appendix Table 1). Circles represent cell-specifc 
outcome means. Cells defined over 5-score intervals (350-354, etc.). Vertical lines plotted for cells 540-544 
and 560-564.
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Appendix A Figure 2: Assignment score and elite school attendance by grade in 1962
Notes: see notes to Figure 2.
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Appendix A Table 1: sample selection and subsample definitions
N
Original sample 12150  
Did not move during 1962-64 (358) May have left Aberdeen
Not private primary school (255) Some of  these didn't take test
Not RC primary school (299) Most took test, but stayed in RC school
Not RC private primary school (81) Same arguments as previous two
Not primary elite school already (504) Always stay in elite school
Not primary special school (167) Some of  these didn't take test
Not primary school outside Aberdeen (12)  Attend secondary outside Aberdeen
Not missing grade info (47)  Because we want to split by grade
Not missing assignment info (172)  Need to construct IV
Not missing test scores at ages 7, 9 (309)  Need for covariate controls
Not secondary outside Aberdeen (123) No secondary info
Base sample 9893
Not in grade 3 in 1962 (2033)  Different assignment procedure
Not missing 2001 survey responses (3151)  Needed for outcomes
Final sample 4709
Notes: Description of  sample selection procedure applied to original data.
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Appendix A Table 2: Falisification tests of  elite school impacts
OLS OLS+X 2SLS OLS OLS+X 2SLS
2.228 0.486 -0.131 2.184 0.230 0.033
(0.092) (0.098) (0.148) (0.097) (0.091) (0.122)
0.399 0.075 -0.012 0.395 0.034 0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020)
0.270 0.066 -0.004 0.263 0.027 0.013
(0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
0.362 0.037 -0.002 0.345 0.001 -0.028
(0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.017) (0.014) (0.021)
0.053 -0.007 -0.008 0.047 -0.008 -0.016
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
0.288 0.042 -0.031 0.281 0.017 -0.005
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
-0.095 -0.063 -0.046 -0.116 -0.054 -0.041
(0.009) (0.013) (0.022) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020)
-0.040 -0.015 -0.001 -0.042 -0.013 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
0.018 -0.005 0.001 0.018 0.000 -0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Degree
Notes: see notes to Table 2. The dependent variables in these models are those
predicted by a regression of the relevant outcomes on dummies for father's
occupation, mother's socio-economic status, school and grade attended in 1962,
relative age within the school-grade and third-order polynomials in the age-7 and age-
9 test scores. 
Any children
Number of  
children
Log Annual 
Income
Employed
Currently 
married
Imputed 
hourly wage
A levels
Years of  
education
Men Women
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Appendix A Table 3: Impact of  elite school attendance: robustness check
Order 2 Order 3 Order 4 Order 2 Order 3 Order 4
1.029 0.925 0.667 0.813 0.793 0.604
(0.309) (0.310) (0.430) (0.262) (0.254) (0.311)
0.162 0.105 0.051 0.245 0.229 0.122
(0.061) (0.064) (0.090) (0.054) (0.052) (0.067)
0.153 0.170 0.184 0.024 0.036 0.023
(0.056) (0.056) (0.078) (0.044) (0.042) (0.052)
-0.081 -0.115 -0.251 0.138 0.154 0.255
(0.075) (0.081) (0.110) (0.100) (0.098) (0.129)
-0.042 -0.041 0.039 -0.018 -0.010 0.031
(0.034) (0.040) (0.056) (0.036) (0.037) (0.053)
0.003 -0.035 -0.136 0.072 0.073 0.083
(0.054) (0.056) (0.080) (0.051) (0.050) (0.061)
0.259 0.278 0.259 -0.372 -0.388 -0.585
(0.171) (0.176) (0.256) (0.124) (0.128) (0.169)
0.020 0.017 -0.027 -0.087 -0.081 -0.140
(0.060) (0.060) (0.087) (0.043) (0.042) (0.054)
-0.013 -0.004 -0.073 0.056 0.051 0.030
(0.062) (0.063) (0.089) (0.047) (0.048) (0.065)
Men
2SLS
Women
2SLS
A levels
Years of  
education
Number of  
children
Degree
Log Annual 
Income
Any children
Employed
Imputed 
hourly wage
Notes: see notes to Table 2. The 2SLS estimates correspond to the "2SLS"
estimates in Tables 1-3. Those estimates used a third-order polynomial hence are
reproduced in the "Order 3" column. The "Order 2" and "Order 4" columns report
estimates obtained with second- and fourth-order polynomials respectively.
Currently 
married
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Appendix A Table 4: Education impacts by SES
OLS OLS+X 2SLS 2SLS+X OLS OLS+X 2SLS 2SLS+X
2.951 0.961 0.738 0.732 3.112 1.294 0.653 0.650
(0.146) (0.209) (0.253) (0.256) (0.119) (0.180) (0.297) (0.285)
0.565 0.205 0.164 0.151 0.539 0.251 0.163 0.157
(0.028) (0.043) (0.053) (0.054) (0.022) (0.036) (0.057) (0.058)
0.341 0.098 0.067 0.063 0.398 0.135 0.091 0.075
(0.025) (0.036) (0.044) (0.043) (0.022) (0.029) (0.053) (0.050)
 
0.494 0.122 0.149 0.131 0.394 0.143 -0.111 -0.056
(0.044) (0.069) (0.101) (0.094) (0.042) (0.066) (0.116) (0.108)
0.075 0.002 0.026 0.047 0.033 -0.023 -0.058 -0.070
(0.016) (0.029) (0.038) (0.042) (0.015) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
0.347 0.016 -0.017 -0.042 0.352 0.106 0.005 0.039
(0.029) (0.041) (0.057) (0.051) (0.021) (0.032) (0.061) (0.057)
 
-0.111 -0.103 -0.230 -0.204 -0.116 -0.053 -0.019 0.015
(0.057) (0.102) (0.146) (0.151) (0.047) (0.092) (0.140) (0.139)
-0.050 -0.007 -0.042 -0.028 -0.047 -0.041 -0.055 -0.063
(0.020) (0.034) (0.050) (0.052) (0.017) (0.034) (0.050) (0.050)
0.026 0.005 0.017 0.027 0.003 0.002 0.016 0.016
(0.025) (0.041) (0.065) (0.067) (0.018) (0.033) (0.051) (0.053)
 
Control mean=2.05, N=2576 Control mean=2.36, N=2068
Low-SES High-SES
Years of  
education
A levels
Control mean=0.89, N=2068
Employed
Control mean=0.91, N=2576
Control mean=0.16, N=2576 Control mean=0.16, N=2068
Log Annual 
Income
Control mean=9.67, N=2521 Control mean=9.71, N=2032
Control mean=0.79, N=2570 Control mean=0.84, N=2064
Number of  
children
Imputed 
hourly wage
Control mean=0.41, N=2576 Control mean=0.46, N=2068
Degree
Notes: see notes to Table 2. Low-SES is defined as father's social class 1 through 4 (lower-skilled, semi-
skilled, unskilled manual or not working); high-SES is defined as father's social class 5 through 8 (skilled
manual occupation that required an apprenticeship, non-manual, intermediate or professional occupation).
Any children
Control mean=2.07, N=2284
Control mean=0.89, N=2574 Control mean=0.88, N=2062
Currently 
married
Control mean=2.13, N=1838
Control mean=2.05, N=2575 Control mean=1.89, N=2064
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Appendix B: Aberdeen Cohort and Labour Force
Survey Comparison
Appendix B Table 1: Aberdeen Study versus Labour Force Survey: age left full-time education
Aberdeen LFS 01/02 (1) LFS 01/02 (2) Aberdeen LFS 01/02 (1) LFS 01/02 (2)
All UK Born in Scotland All UK Born in Scotland
<=14 1.40 2.75 2.03 1.03 2.80 1.25
15 40.98 30.02 39.56 37.67 31.02 40.15
16 21.01 29.42 25.61 23.54 28.13 24.35
17 8.31 7.89 9.17 12.54 9.61 10.59
18 7.50 8.36 7.50 5.92 9.49 5.32
19+ 20.80 21.56 16.13 19.40 18.94 18.35
Observations 2,865 19,967 2069 3,093 20,850 2134
Note: The Aberdeen sample consists of the entire sample of individuals replying to the 2001 survey. The LFS 01/02 (1)
sample consists of all individuals born between 1950 and 1955 in the last 2 quarters of 2001 and the first 2 quarters of
2002. The LFS 2001/02 (2) sample restricts the LFS 2001/02 (1) sample to all individuals born in Scotland. LFS data is
weighted using sampling weights.   
MEN WOMEN
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Appendix B Table 2:  Aberdeen Study versus Labour Force Survey: highest educational qualification
Aberdeen LFS 01/02 (1) LFS 01/02 (2) Aberdeen LFS 01/02 (1) LFS 01/02 (2)
All UK Born in Scotland All UK Born in Scotland
None 20.40 21.08 22.71 23.98 26.99 31.50
Other qual. 2.72 9.92 7.14 3.51 9.38 5.41
Low CSEs 0.88 1.56 1.09 4.26 5.74 2.50
O level or equivalent 22.48 23.17 20.42 29.26 23.15 18.85
A level or equivalent 14.75 8.50 11.84 11.38 8.31 13.83
HNC, teaching, etc.  20.05 16.80 20.84 13.58 13.15 15.03
Degree 18.71 18.96 15.97 14.04 13.27 12.87
Observations 2,833 19,888 2069 3,049 20,792 2134
Note: see notes to Appendix B Table 1. 
MEN WOMEN
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Appendix B Table 3: Labour Force Survey - percent with trade apprenticeship
LFS 01/02 (1) LFS 01/02 (2) LFS 01/02 (1) LFS 01/02 (2)
All UK Born in Scotland All UK Born in Scotland
None 26.17 35.06 5.02 6.86
Other qual. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Low CSEs 15.00 32.22 2.81 9.14
O level or equivalent 46.06 57.73 6.04 6.85
A level or equivalent 20.18 12.51 3.21 5.13
HNC, teaching, etc.  62.89 71.31 9.16 7.00
Degree 10.21 7.24 3.34 3.16
Total 30.66 37.68 4.84 5.85
Observations 19,790 2,061 20,737 2,130
Note: In the LFS trade apprenticeships are recorded in a separate question and are not included among the 
qualifications listed above. Numbers show the percentage of individuals with the corresponding level of qualification 
who also hold a trade apprenticeship. LFS samples as described in Appendix B Table 1.
MEN WOMEN
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Appendix B Table 4: Aberdeen Study versus Labour Force Survey: returns to education - gross annual income (Aberdeen), gross weekly pay (LFS)
Years of post-compulsory education 0.072 0.075 0.090
(0.004) (0.001) (0.007)
Left ft education at 15 or earlier - - -
Left ft education at 16 0.200 0.176 0.155
(0.027) (0.009) (0.048)
Left ft education at 17 0.266 0.308 0.361
(0.039) (0.013) (0.064)
Left ft education at 18 0.413 0.411 0.356
(0.041) (0.014) (0.076)
Left ft education at 19+ 0.458 0.595 0.648
(0.028) (0.010) (0.050)
Observations 2152 2152 27,665 27,665 727 727
Years of post-compulsory education 0.128 0.123 0.123
(0.006) (0.002) (0.011)
Left ft education at 15 or earlier - - -
Left ft education at 16 0.186 0.208 0.096
(0.035) (0.012) (0.062)
Left ft education at 17 0.326 0.367 0.321
(0.041) (0.016) (0.071)
Left ft education at 18 0.368 0.504 0.368
(0.056) (0.016) (0.098)
Left ft education at 19+ 0.801 0.829 0.832
(0.036) (0.013) (0.063)
Observations 2316 2316 29,032 29,032 794 794
WOMEN
Note: Cells show least squares estimates of the returns to years of post-compulsory education. Dependent variable is log gross annual income for 
the Aberdeen sample and the log of the gross weekly wage for the LFS samples. Samples restricted to employees in work at the time of the survey. 
The Aberdeen sample consists of the entire sample of individuals replying to the 2001 survey. LFS samples as described in Appendix B Table 1.
MEN
Aberdeen LFS 01/02 (1) LFS 01/02 (2)
All UK Born in Scotland
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Appendix C: A Model of School Quality with
Vocational Training
In this Appendix we present a simple model to support the argument made
in section 5, that for men, the existence of vocational training likely explains
the absence of elite school effects on income. We begin with a baseline model
without vocational training. This is adapted from the model that Card and
Krueger (1996) used to examine the labor market implications of attending
different school systems (our focus is on different types of school within the
same system). We then introduce vocational training into the model.
C1: Baseline Model without Vocational Training
Modifying the Card and Krueger (1996) model slightly, we assume that indi-
viduals that have reached the compulsory school leaving age choose between
leaving school and continuing in academic education for a further A years. We
assume that for individual i that attended school type s ∈ {Nonelite, Elite},
this choice is made to maximize the following utility function:1
U(yis, Ais) = lnyis − f(Ais)
lnyis = θi + θs + b
A
s Ais + uis
f(Ais) = γ
A
s ciAis +
k
2
A2is
where yis is annual earnings, θi is person-specific ability and ci is the person-
specific cost of academic education. We make the standard assumption that
1Card and Krueger (1996) assume that:
U(yis, Eis) = lnyis − f(Eis)
lnyis = ai + bsEis + uis
f(Eis) = ciEis +
k
2
E2is
where E is total years of education (including compulsory school years).
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Cov(θi, ci) < 0. The remaining parameters capture the effect of school type
on the productivity of the (compulsory) years spent in school (θs), the return
to additional years of academic education (bAs ) and the cost of additional years
of academic education (γAs ci).
It seems reasonable to allow the return to additional schooling to depend
on the type of school attended: as Card and Krueger (1996) noted, a high-
quality education may improve a student’s ability to benefit from additional
education. There are two reasons why it seems reasonable to allow the costs of
additional education to depend on school type. First, since some of the post-
compulsory education that took place in our setting occurred within the elite
schools (i.e., students from non-elite schools had to transfer in), this may have
created additional costs for non-elite students. Second, more generally and
more plausibly, while the majority of elite school students stayed in academic
education, the majority of non-elite school students did not, such that it might
have been less costly for elite students to comply with default behavior than
for non-elite school students to defy it (e.g., because of the costs of being
separated from friends).
Maximization reveals the optimal schooling choice to beA∗i = max{ b
A
s −γAs ci
k
, 0}
and maximized utility to be:
U(yis, A
∗
is) = θi + θs +max{
(bAs − γAs ci)2
2k
, 0}+ uis
Proposition 1 summarizes three implications of this model.
Proposition 1
Assume the following conditions hold:
C1: The returns to academic education are higher for students that attended
an elite school (bAE > bAN).
C2: The cost of academic education is lower for students that attended an
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elite school (γAE < γAN).
In that case:
1. There is some cost cutoff below which all individuals will pursue some
academic education and above which no individuals will pursue any aca-
demic education. Among the students that pursue academic education,
the length of academic education is decreasing in cost.
2. Elite school students will pursue more post-compulsory education.
3. Elite school students will obtain higher wages.
Proof
The first claim follows from inspection of the expression for A∗. The second
follows from this expression and the assumption that E[ci] is the same for elite
and non-elite students (among the borderline students). The third follows
from substituting this expression into the equation for wages.
C.2: Vocational Training
We introduce vocational training by allowing students to choose between
two post-secondary tracks: academic and vocational. Conditional on choos-
ing the vocational track, we assume students solve a maximization problem
similar to the one presented above, but with parameters bAs and γAs replaced
with parameters bVs and γVs . We make the following assumptions on these
parameters:
A1: bAs > bVs
A2: b
A
s
γAs
< b
V
s
γVs
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The first will ensure that the lowest-cost individuals (in expectation the most-
able individuals) will choose academic training. The second will ensure that
students on the margin of choosing vocational training over leaving school
without pursuing any education will prefer vocational training to academic
education.2
Proposition 2
1. Given assumptions A1 and A2, schooling decisions can be characterized
by two cutoffs cL and cM . Students with ci < cL will pursue academic
education, with the length of academic education decreasing in cost;
students with cL < ci < cM will pursue vocational training, with the
length of vocational training decreasing in cost; students with ci > cM
will leave school without pursuing any vocational training or academic
education.
2. An increase in bAs or a decrease in γAs will increase the fraction of students
that pursue academic education and decrease the fraction that pursue
vocational training, with the fraction that leave school without pursuing
any vocational training or academic education unchanged.
3. An increase in bVs or a decrease in γVs will increase the fraction of stu-
dents that pursue vocational training and decrease the fraction that leave
school without pursuing any vocational training or academic education.
Proof
The proposition can be proved with reference to Figure 1. In particular, we
2It seems plausible to suppose the return to vocational training is lower than the return
to academic education, since vocational training can be thought of as a combination of
education and unskilled work. It seems plausible to suppose that the cost of vocational
training is lower than the cost of academic education since vocational training pays a training
wage.
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can show that cM = b
V
s
γVs
(i.e., the type indifferent between vocational training
and leaving school) and we know that U(V ∗i ; cM) = 0 while U(A∗i ;
bAs
γAs
) = 0,
where cM > b
A
s
γAs
. We know that U(A∗i ; 0) =
(bAs )
2
2k
> U(V ∗i ; 0) and we can show
that U(A∗i ; ci) and U(V ∗i ; ci) cross at most once over the range ci ∈ [0, cM ].3
The second and third parts of the Proposition then follow from Figure 1.
Proposition 3
If, in addition to conditions C1 and C2 and assumptions A1 and A2, we
have the following condition:
C3: The costs of vocational training are higher for elite-school than non-elite
school students
then:
1. Students assigned to elite school will pursue more post-compulsory aca-
demic education
2. Students assigned to elite school will pursue less vocational training
3. Assignment to an elite school need not increase wages
Proof
The first two claims follow immediately from Figure 2. The expected wage
return to attending an elite school can be expressed as follows, where 4i ≡
lnyEi − lnyNi:
3Otherwise, since the difference between them is continuous, and since it is positive when
ci = 0 and negative when ci = cM , there would be have to be two turning points. The first-
order condition for a turning point demonstrates that there can be at most one value of ci
in this range.
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E(∆i) =
ˆ cL(N)
0
[(bAE)
2 − γAEbAEci − (bAN)2 + γANbANci]f(ci)dci
+
ˆ cL(E)
cL(N)
[(bAE)
2 − γAEbAEci − (bV )2 + γVNbV ci]f(ci)dci
+
ˆ cM(E)
cL(E)
[(bV )2 − γVE bV ci − (bV )2 + γVNbV ci]f(ci)dci
+
ˆ cM(N)
cM(E)
[−(bV )2 + γVNbV ci]f(ci)dci
It is straightforward to construct examples in which the net effect is negative.4
The intuition is that assignment to an elite school has ambiguous effects on
human capital, increasing it for some (lower-cost) students that would anyway
be inclined to academic study and decreasing it for other (higher-cost) students
that would have pursued vocational training had they been assigned to the
non-elite school.
C.3: Measured returns to education
An obvious question is whether the model can account for any of the other
facts presented. We show that it can account for the lower return to academic
education measured for men. To see why, note that:
E[lnyi|Ais] = E(θi|Ais) + θs + bAs Ais + bVE(Vis|Ais)
= E(θi|Ais) + θs + bAs Ais + bV (cons+ rAVAis)
= E(θi|Ais) + θs + (bAs + rV AbV )Ais
4To construct an example in which the net effect is negative, suppose ci ∼ U [0, c] where
c > cM(N), such that:
E(4i) = 1
kc
{[(bAE)2 − (bAN )2]cL(N) + [(bAE)2 − (bV )2](cL(E) − cL(N))− (bV )2(cM(N) − cM(E))
+[γANb
A
N − γVNbV ]
c2L(N)
2
+ [γVE b
V − γAEbAE ]
c2L(E)
2
− γVE bV
c2M(E)
2
+ γVNb
V
c2M(N)
2
}
If bV = 0.08, bAN = 0.1, b
A
E = 0.12, γ
V
N = 0.28, γ
V
E = 0.35, γ
A
N = 1.4, γ
A
E = 1.3, c = 0.3,
k = 0.01 and θE = θN , then it is simple to show that E(4i) ∼ −0.01.
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= E(θi|Ais) + θs + [bAs −
E(Vis|Ais = 0)
E(Ais|Ais > 0)b
V ]Ais
The presence of vocational training has two effects on the estimated returns
to education. First, it generates the bias represented by the second term
in square brackets. It can be seen that this will be zero if bV = 0 (since
E(Vis|Ais = 0) = 0), but positive otherwise. If c is distributed uniformly,
then:
E(Vis|Ais = 0) = [b
V
s − γVs ( cL+cM2 )
k
]
cM − cL
c− cL
E(Ais|Ais > 0) = [b
A
s − γAs ( cL2 )
k
]
Bias = bV [
bVs − γVs ( cL+cM2 )
bAs − γAs ( cL2 )
]
cM − cL
c− cL
Using the same parameters described above, it can be shown that this bias is
on the order of 25 percent of the true return to academic education.
Second, vocational training weakens the ability bias generated by the first
term E(θi|Ais). Intuitively, that is because vocational training weakens the
correlation between costs (hence ability) and academic education. Both forces
imply that the measured returns to academic education will be smaller in the
presence of vocational training.
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